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Abstract   Small and informal enterprises are preponderant in Africa’s manufacturing 
sector.  Their growth is negligibly low except when young and small, but little is known 
beyond this.  This paper reports the results of our field study of a metalworking cluster 
in Nairobi.  As competition was intensified by the entry of new enterprises, the 
education level of entrepreneurs became important in determining enterprise 
performance, which is reminiscent of East Asian experiences.  Recently, some 
enterprises have left for formal industrial areas partly because their original sites have 
become too congested for them to grow and partly because being formal facilitates 
marketing and further growth. 
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1  Introduction 
The manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by very small and 
informal enterprises, and the majority of them grow only when they are young, as 
Collier and Gunning (1999), Tybout (2000), and Bigsten and Söderbom (2006) among 
others attest.  Because of the lack of growth, their job creation falls far short of what 
they are expected to achieve.  A number of possibly serious hindrances to enterprise 
growth have been enumerated in the literature.  For example, Sleuwaegen and 
Goedhuys (2002) argue that small and informal enterprises are reluctant to become large 
because being large requires being formal and, thus, being subject to excessive 
regulations.  Collier and Gunning (1999) among others call attention to market failures 
in insurance and credit markets, which would be especially serious for very small 
enterprises.   
In their excellent review of this literature on enterprise growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Bigsten and Söderbom (2006, p. 260) conclude, while arguing among other 
things that uncertainty is more detrimental to capital investment than credit constraints: 
“Improving our understanding of why these major results are observed seems an 
important area for future research.”  Another interesting finding is the positive 
association between enterprise growth and the general human capital or formal 
education of entrepreneurs, which is reported by McPherson (1996), Ramachandran and 
Shah (1999), Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000), Mengistae (2006), and Akoten and 
Otsuka (2007).  How can we reconcile the positive effect of human capital on enterprise 
growth with the general observation that industries stay at stationary points with 
enterprises growing only when they are young and very small?  
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Industrial clusters in Nairobi can be divided into formal and informal clusters. 
Formal clusters include the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and the Industrial Area. 
Informal clusters are ubiquitous in Nairobi and tend to be sector-specific. There are 
three garment clusters: Kariobangi, Gikomba, and Uhuru (Akoten and Otsuka, 2007). 
Combined, they have about 500 garment enterprises with the rest of the stalls (648) 
being used for other activities. The market for the Eastlands cluster (i.e., Gikomba and 
Uhuru) is domestic, mainly in Nairobi and distant towns. In terms of their average 
employment size, Uhuru has 3.9 workers, Kariobangi has 2.5 workers, and Gikomba 
has 3.5 workers (Akoten and Otsuka, 2007). There are two metalworking clusters: 
Kariobangi (our study site) and Kamukunji. The former is further away from Nairobi 
than the latter, which is located in the outskirts of Nairobi near the main bus terminus. 
Kamukunji has about 2000 enterprises which produce charcoal cooking stoves, buckets, 
pans, kitchen utensils, wheel-barrows, watering cans, and small tools. Kamukunji’s 
products are less sophisticated and tend to be of lower quality than those of Kariobangi. 
These clusters also produce a limited number of spare parts such as silencers, auto 
upholstery, and rubber bushes. The market for these clusters is mainly individuals from 
Nairobi, especially owners of commercial vehicles. 
Our study site is called Kariobangi Light Industries since the local government 
designated it to be an area for artisans in 1989.  Its development dates from the early 
1980s, when the workers of formal-sector factories lost jobs as a consequence of the 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and began to establish 
garages and workshops along the main road.  They cleared the bushes to construct roads 
inside the area.  The current population of enterprises is about 300, and half of them are 
related to metalworking.  They call themselves Jua Kali in Swahili, meaning informal-
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sector artisans.1  This cluster is informal and may be categorized as what Altenburg and 
Meyer-Stamer (1999) call a “survival cluster of micro and small-scale enterprises,” 
which produce generally low-quality products and sell them primarily at domestic 
markets. While the networking of enterprises within the cluster in the form of the 
transaction of parts and production services plays an important role, as in other clusters 
in developing countries, global buyers play no role in transmitting best practices and 
upgrading designs, production layouts, and skills  (e.g., Humphrey 2003; Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2001).  Since the government does not provide any support to this cluster 
except for having provided space initially, bureaucratic corruption is limited to illegal 
levies on factory operation in return for exemption from formal tax payments (Mbaku 
1996).  
Our data set contains recall information on five years, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
and 2006, during which some enterprises attempted to improve their products.  In the 
1990s and early 2000s, enterprises in Kariobangi Light Industries produced low-quality 
products, and there were many enterprises producing almost the same products, because 
the production of such products was easy but profitable when the producers were few in 
number.  As the entry of new enterprises continued, however, the profitability of 
producing such low-quality products declined.  Instead, improvement in the quality of 
products, together with the introduction of new marketing channels suitable to the 
improved products, became profitable. Although this cluster seems to have improved 
enterprise performance by knowledge transmission or spillovers as argued in the 
literature on industrial clusters (e.g., Humphrey 2003, Humphrey and Schmitz 2001), 
                                                 
1 The literal translation of Jua Kali is “hot sun,” and this term refers to informal-sector artisans 
because they work outside under the hot sun.  See King (1996) for detailed descriptions of the 
activities and history of the Jua Kali sector in Kenya. 
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the performance among enterprises differs greatly.  We hypothesize that 
entrepreneurs become increasingly motivated to make the innovations that 
increase profitability, and that the more highly educated entrepreneurs are more 
likely to succeed in achieving such improvements. 2      
We found that the effects of the education level of entrepreneurs on employment 
size and its growth became stronger in later years than in earlier years.  These results are 
consistent with the results of the eight case studies conducted in East Asia by Sonobe 
and Otsuka (2006). 3   An interesting feature of our data is the inclusion of seven 
enterprises that left Kariobangi for formal industrial areas.  To our knowledge, no 
existing study has traced such leavers and has compared the behavior and performance 
before and after becoming formal.  The leavers told us that they left Kariobangi because 
they needed more spacious sites, and that their relocation facilitated marketing greatly 
by improving the reputation of the enterprises.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  After explaining our method of data 
collection, the next section describes what products and services the enterprises at the 
Kariobangi Light Industries produce.   Section 3 compares the characteristics of the 
leavers and the remaining group. This section also advances our hypotheses concerning 
the changing roles of the entrepreneurs’ human capital in determining their enterprise 
performances.  Hypothesis testing is carried out through regression analyses in Section 
4.  Section 5 concludes the paper with the policy implications. 
                                                 
2 Rocha (2004) points our that more research on the impact of entrepreneurship on cluster development is 
needed. 
3 There are several studies which compare the performance of formal and informal enterprises using  
cross-section data in sub-Saharan Africa.  Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000) find the positive effect 
of formal registration on the growth of firm size in Côte d’Ivoire, whereas McPherson and Liedholm 
(1996) demonstrate the positive effect of firm size on formal registration in Niger and Swaziland.  
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2   Data 
At Kariobangi Light Industries, no census of the enterprises has been carried out in the 
past.  The Kariobangi Jua Kali Association, however, estimated the number of 
manufacturing enterprises to be around 150 as of 2006.4 We included hardware shops in 
the sample because the production of fabricated metal products and hardware trading 
can be done by these enterprises and because sheet bending and some other services can 
be done by both metal product enterprises and hardware shops.  We also added to the 
sample the seven leavers, who are defined as enterprises that have relocated from 
Kariobangi Light Industries to the Baba Ndogo Industrial Area or the Mukuru Kwa 
Njenga Industrial Area by the time of our survey.  The association identified nearly 150 
enterprises as satisfying our specifications.  In September 2006, we attempted a survey 
of all these enterprises, but were only able to meet 127 entrepreneurs as shown.   
Enterprises engaged in fabrication of metal products, such as steel windows, steel 
furniture, and simple machines, account for nearly 40% of enterprises.  More than half 
of this group produces non-mechanical items, such as window frames, grilles, and 
furniture.  The rest of this group produces mechanical devices, such as scale balances 
and flour mills.  The producers of these simple machines tend to contract out the 
production of parts to small foundries and lathe turners located nearby.  Besides such 
subcontracting, these parts makers produce simple repair parts for vehicles as well.  
Also, the lathe turners repair balance scales and parts for cars and simple machines, and 
produce hinges, bolts, and nuts that are used by producers of steel gates and furniture.   
These foundries and lathe turners constitute the second group in Kariobangi, accounting 
                                                 
4 Those enterprises on the other side of the main roads that surround the Kariobangi Light Industries 
are excluded from this number as well as our sample. 
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for about 30% of enterprises.  The third group is engaged in car repair and is called 
garages or garage mechanics.  Garages here include panel beaters.  Thus, the division of 
labor is practiced among machine producers, non-mechanical fabricators, garages, and 
parts suppliers.  Almost all of them procure materials from hardware traders.  Therefore, 
our study site is characterized by a cluster of metalwork enterprises.   
According to the leaders of the association, the entry of new enterprises was 
active throughout the 1990s but has declined since the early 2000s despite the favorable 
macroeconomic condition in recent years.  Such an evolution of the number of new 
entrants may be explained as follows.  The metal products produced in Kariobangi are 
obviously copies of imported products.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the demand for low-
quality but cheap substitutes for expensive imports would have been high because such 
substitutes were in short supply.  Noticing that the pioneers earned high profits, 
followers began producing copies of the original product.  As the number of producers 
increased, parts suppliers and hardware shops emerged, and all of them have benefited 
from the development of the division of labor.  The proliferation of the producers of the 
same products would, however, lower the product prices and hence the profitability.  
When we gave this account of the evolution of the number of new entrants and 
profitability to 51 entrepreneurs who attended a workshop, all of them agreed with us. 
According to Sonobe and Otsuka (2006), a similar development process was observed 
in industrial clusters in Japan, Taiwan, and China. 
Another reason for the decreasing entry of new enterprises is the increasing 
congestion and worsening insecurity in Kariobangi.  The congestion has been 
aggravated by the increased population of inhabitants in the area.  While the area is 
designated as industrial, it now has many three- to five-story buildings that use only the 
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ground floor for businesses and the upper stories as apartments.  The residents of these 
apartments complain of the noises and smells coming from the workshops.  The hostile 
attitudes of the new inhabitants and the inflow of refugees from the neighboring 
countries have resulted in insecurity problems, which have become so serious that the 
association has organized a vigilante group by mobilizing jobless young men recently. 
Table 1 presents proportion of the entrepreneurs who have worked for the formal 
sector, such as Indian and other foreign ventures, before they started their own 
businesses in Kariobangi.  It is shown that 62% of enterprises have worked in the formal 
sector.  There are 28 entrepreneurs who have experienced being both Jua Kali and 
workers in the formal sector, and 15 who have neither type of work experience.  Among 
the seven leavers, two were Jua Kali from the beginning of their careers, four were 
skilled workers or middle managers at formal-sector factories, and one was a civil 
engineer employed by the government.   
Why did so many entrepreneurs come from the formal sector to Kariobangi to 
become Jua Kali?  A push factor would be the implementation of the SAP and the 
subsequent contraction of the formal manufacturing sector.  Pull factors would be the 
initially high demand for cheap substitutes for imported products, which very small 
workshops could easily produce with inexpensive equipment while enjoying the 
benefits arising from the agglomeration.  Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) develop a 
model in which increases in employment size make it more difficult to monitor workers 
and necessitate offering higher wages to workers in order to discourage shirking.  
According to their estimates, the wage rate increases with the expansion of employment 
size more steeply in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Morocco.  Jua Kali clusters like 
Kariobangi Light Industries would provide the skilled workers and middle managers of 
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large formal-sector factories with lucrative outside opportunities and hence contribute to 
wage increases in the formal sector.5   The high wages would, in turn, weaken the 
competitiveness of the large factories and lead to further downsizing. 
Table 1 also compares the leavers and the remaining group with respect to the 
enterprise size, which is measured by the number of workers.  We found it much more 
difficult to obtain reliable data on other measures of enterprise size, such as value added 
and sales revenues, which seems to be a common problem in enterprise surveys in Sub-
Saharan Africa in view of the fact that many studies of enterprise growth in the region 
focus on employment.  Leavers employed 25.1 workers on average in 2006, whereas the 
remaining enterprises in Kariobangi employed only 5.1 workers on average.  None of 
the parts suppliers left Kariobangi for formal industrial areas by 2006.  Probably, parts 
suppliers have less incentive to leave because their major customers are in Kariobangi.6  
The garage that entered the formal sector employed as many as 30 workers, whereas the 
garages that remain informal had only 4.3 workers on average.  If all the activities are 
combined, the mean employment size of the leavers is four times as large as that of the 
remaining group, which is consistent with the finding of Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen 
(2000). 
The leavers gave us three reasons for their relocation during our interviews with 
them.  Firstly, the insecurity or the fear of being mugged in Kariobangi repelled 
prospective customers.  Secondly, for prospective customers, Kariobangi and the term 
Jua Kali are synonymous with poor-quality products.  Thirdly, unlike the formal 
industrial areas, Kariobangi has very poor infrastructure and little space for the 
                                                 
5 In Nairobi, there are other Jua Kali clusters including the Kamukunji metalwork cluster, whose 
activities and history are described by Kinyanjui (2007). 
6 There are transactions between parts suppliers in Kariobangi and at least one of the leavers, 
however. 
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expansion of operation.  The first two reasons concern the difficulty in marketing in 
Kariobangi.  The unreliable supply of electricity, which is included in the third reason, 
would discourage mechanization.  Bumpy and muddy roads would make it difficult to 
ship high precision products.  The limited space would directly constrain enterprise 
growth.   Relocation to a formal industrial area would sweep away these problems, even 
though it is costly because of moving costs and regulations, including income tax 
payment. 
 
3   Human capital of entrepreneurs and enterprise performance 
Table 1 presents the data on the characteristics of entrepreneurs.  The leavers are a little 
older (i.e., 45.6 years old in 2006) than the others, and they were 43.6 years old on 
average when their enterprises were relocated to formal industrial areas. The leavers 
have longer years of formal schooling and formal vocational training, longer work 
experience prior to starting their own businesses, and longer experience of management 
thereafter.  To sum up, they are likely to have both more abundant general and specific 
human capital than the remaining group.  In addition, four of the seven leavers have 
partners, who had similar backgrounds and would have been able to help the 
entrepreneurs.  Four entrepreneurs inherited businesses from their parents, but the vast 
majority of the sample entrepreneurs started their own businesses.   
In our definition, formal vocational training includes technical training in 
mechanical engineering at a polytechnic, but it does not include the study of mechanical 
engineering at a university.  Instead, the latter is included in formal schooling.  We 
include any training, whether provided at polytechnics or other institutions, in 
vocational training as opposed to schooling if it emphasizes practical aspects and 
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attaches little importance to theoretical aspects.  University education attaches 
importance to theories even in specialized courses such as mechanical engineering.   
In our sample, more than 80 percent of the entrepreneurs received technical 
training or education either at vocational schools, colleges, or universities.  The majority 
used to work at formal-sector factories.  Judging from the educational and occupational 
backgrounds of the entrepreneurs, therefore, the cluster is considered to be fairly 
abundant in human capital specific to engineering areas.    
Only one-third of the entrepreneurs knew what jigs and fixtures were, when they 
started their businesses (Sonobe et al. 2009b).  Jigs and fixtures are small devices that 
lathe turners make to increase the precision and efficiency of their work.  They are 
indispensable for the mass processing of high-precision parts.  Fabricators may not use 
jigs or fixtures themselves but they should be interested to know whether the lathe 
turners processing parts for them use them.  The low percentage of entrepreneurs with 
knowledge regarding jigs and fixtures indicates that the engineering knowledge held by 
the entrepreneurs when they started their businesses was limited.  However as of 2006, 
the majority of the entrepreneurs of all types and more than 70 percent of the leavers 
and those with experience in the formal sector knew what jigs and fixtures were, even 
though only a few of them actually use them.  This increase in knowledge suggests that 
the entrepreneurs are increasingly interested in the mass production of high-quality parts 
and products processed with lathes. 
 Despite this general improvement of production knowledge, some entrepreneurs 
continued to produce low quality products. Our discussion with the entrepreneurs 
reveals four reasons.  First, because of stiff competition, some incapable entrepreneurs 
decided to target the low-end customers who do not mind about low quality. Second, 
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most entrepreneurs who produce low quality products have low levels of education. 
This limits their capacity to learn and be innovative. Third, according to the local 
authority statutory requirement, all firms are supposed to pay for the Single Business 
Permit in order to operate. Since the production of higher-quality products requires a 
greater number of machines and tools, larger space is needed.  This space cost increases 
the cost of producing high-quality products thereby hindering less capable entrepreneurs 
from upgrading their products. Fourth, because they use low quality materials, the 
products they produce are also of low quality. 
On the other hand, some entrepreneurs are striving to upgrade their products.  In 
our observation, the entrepreneurs become increasingly motivated to improve their 
product quality as the proliferation of producers intensifies competition and lowers the 
profitability of producing low-quality and standard products.  However, the 
improvement of products itself will not increase profits unless buyers recognize the 
improved quality and appreciate it, as is attested by the case study of an electric 
appliance cluster in China conducted by Sonobe et al. (2004).  Thus, differentiating an 
enterprise’s own improved products clearly from inferior products produced by other 
enterprises through branding and establishing new own marketing channels becomes 
critically important.  The improvement of product quality may be easy for the 
entrepreneurs in the Jua Kali cluster who are experienced engineers, but it would be 
difficult for those who did not understand the concept of precision.  Upgrading 
marketing methods and finding new marketing channels would be more difficult still for 
almost all the entrepreneurs there.  According to our respondents, information on better 
production techniques and marketing tend to be scarce because of friction in 
information flow within the cluster. Most entrepreneurs operate on a closed-door policy, 
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thereby restricting competitors from visiting their workshops to obtain important 
information. Second, even when information is acquired, lack of credit prevents most 
entrepreneurs from importing better machines that they have learned of. Nonetheless, if 
they succeed in accomplishing these improvements, then their marginal revenue curve 
will shift upward and they will employ a greater number of workers than before.  
However, the expansion will make labor management more difficult than before.  Thus, 
quality improvement will require improved labor management as well. 
We call these improvements “multifaceted innovations,” even though they do not 
refer to truly new applications of scientific discoveries or engineering inventions.  
Formal schooling would assume importance when new decisions are made in a dynamic 
context.  Thus, we contend that those entrepreneurs with higher formal education are 
more likely to succeed in multifaceted innovations in product quality, marketing, and 
management.  In view of the increasing importance of such innovations, a testable 
hypothesis may be postulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The effects of the formal education of the entrepreneurs on 
enterprise size and enterprise growth are positive and have increased over time in the 
Jua Kali cluster.    
In our view, the recent relocation of the six leavers from the cluster to formal 
industrial areas is a result of the increased effects of schooling.  Hypothesis 1 asserts 
that the education effects increased even among the remaining enterprises.  Because 
innovations must be multifaceted, specialized vocational training without much 
emphasis on theoretical thinking will not be as useful as formal schooling for enterprise 
growth.  Thus, we conjecture that the effects of vocational training on size and growth 
will become weaker relative to the effects of formal schooling.   
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 Turning to marketing, our hypothesis is that entrepreneurs become more 
motivated to market their products to the buyers who appreciate high quality, and that 
more educated entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in such marketing.  We may 
refer to the buyers who appreciate high quality as quality-conscious customers for 
convenience.  According to Fafchamps (2004), nearly 80 percent of enterprises in nine 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa sell the whole or part of their output to the end-users of 
their products such as manufacturers and consumers and the rest is sold to merchants.  
Exports account for only eight percent of their output.  Similarly, at Kariobangi Light 
Industries, the most primitive but still the most common way of marketing among 
informal artisans and craftsmen is to wait for individuals to come to the workshops in 
the cluster to buy items for their own use.  This marketing method accounts for 40 to 50 
percent of their sales revenues.7   
Marketing to merchants, i.e., wholesalers and retailers, requires that products of 
relatively uniform quality be produced in large quantities.  In the garment industry in 
Nairobi, Akoten and Otsuka (2007) find that marketing to merchants is more profitable 
than selling to individual customers, and that more educated producers tend to have a 
higher propensity to sell to merchants.  In Kariobangi, however, there seems to be no 
consensus of opinion regarding which marketing channel is more lucrative or which 
requires higher-quality products.  Instead, the sample entrepreneurs would agree that it 
is challenging and hence profitable to sell products to foreign or international companies, 
government and non-government organizations in Kenya, or abroad.  These customers 
are much more conscious about the quality of products than any other types of 
                                                 
7 For the parts suppliers, the most important type of customers is metal product fabricators in the 
cluster, but sales to individuals account for a quarter of their revenues, because they accept repair 
work orders from individuals and sell simple car repair parts to individuals. 
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customers that the enterprises in Kariobangi cater to.  Thus, it seems reasonable to count 
them as quality-conscious customers.   
The last part of Table 1 shows the trends in marketing to quality-conscious 
customers, as well as direct procurement of materials.8   Because a big order from a 
quality buyer may come suddenly toward the end of a year, the percentage of marketing 
to quality-conscious customers for the whole year can be ascertained only after the year 
has ended.  Because we conducted the enterprise survey in September 2006, we could 
not obtain this percentage for 2006.  This is why this table compares 1998/2000 and 
2005 instead of 2006.  By 1998/2000, we mean the pooled data on the two years in 1998 
and 2000.  Although we obtained recall data on employment in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
and 2006, about 40 percent of the sample enterprises started business after 2000.  To 
increase the number of observations up to the level comparable with the later period, we 
took the average of the first two years in the sample. The percentage of sales revenues 
from marketing to quality-conscious customers declined for the remaining enterprises, 
whereas it increased for the leavers. Based on our hypothesis that the major determinant 
of multifaceted innovations is formal schooling, we advance the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  The effects of the formal education of the entrepreneurs on 
marketing to quality-conscious customers are positive and have increased over time in 
the Jua Kali cluster. 
To test this hypothesis, we will examine the effect of education on the percentage 
of sales revenues from marketing to quality buyers. Table 1 also shows the percentage 
of the cost of material purchased directly from factories or trading houses as opposed to 
                                                 
8 The data shown in Table 1 exclude the hardware shops and miscellaneous service providers since 
they have low percentages of marketing to quality-conscious customers due to the nature of their 
lines of trade. 
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that purchased from hardware shops in the cluster or other merchants in Nairobi.9  Such 
direct procurement was an important aspect of the multifaceted innovations in the 
footwear industry in Ethiopia, according to Sonobe et al. (2009a).  Like marketing to 
quality-conscious customers, the share of direct procurement decreased for each type of 
the remaining enterprises, but it increased for the leavers.  These observations suggest 
that it is difficult to accomplish the multifaceted innovations in the Jua Kali cluster.   
According to our discussions with the entrepreneurs, there are at least several 
reasons why most entrepreneurs do not market to higher-end firms. First, the statutory 
requirement that products to be sold to higher-end firms should bear the Kenya Bureau 
of Standards (KEBS) mark of quality is often prohibitively costly. Second, to produce 
high quality products for higher-end firms, better machines are required. However, 
virtually all entrepreneurs use second hand machines and this has hindered their 
capacity to produce high quality products. Third, their low level of education reduces 
the capacity of most entrepreneurs to produce better quality products by mimicking 
successful entrepreneurs or engaging in innovative activities. Fourth, poor accessibility 
to credit makes it challenging for entrepreneurs to sell to higher-end customers who 
prefer paying suppliers a month later after receiving a steady flow of supplies on credit 
for up to two months and selling them. These entrepreneurs cannot borrow from 
financial institutions because they lack appropriate collateral. 
Such growth constraints are increasingly binding as the entrepreneurs are 
motivated to achieve quality improvement under the increasingly strong competitive 
pressure.  Moreover, the worsening insecurity problem and the increasing congestion 
                                                 
9 The lower portion of Table 1 also excludes the hardware shops and miscellaneous service providers. 
The hardware shops procure steel materials from Mombasa.  Hence their percentages of direct 
procurement are much higher than other types of businesses.  Some of the miscellaneous service 
providers are recycle businesses, whose direct purchase is difficult to define.  
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are highly likely to tighten the constraint on enterprise growth.  The growth constraint 
may reveal itself in the growth regression as the negative effect of the current enterprise 
size on the subsequent growth.  Since the constraint is expected to be increasingly 
binding, we hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of the current enterprise size on its subsequent 
growth has become stronger over time in the Jua Kali cluster. 
   
4  Regression analyses 
4.1  Specification 
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we estimate the functions that explain the number 
of workers and its growth rate in the sample that excludes the leavers.  Because we are 
interested in the changes in the strength of the effect of schooling, we estimate these 
functions in each year or period separately to examine whether the coefficients change 
over time.  We exclude the leavers in order to show that the importance of schooling for 
good enterprise performance has increased even among the remaining enterprises.  The 
two functions to be estimated include such explanatory variables as the entrepreneur’s 
years of schooling and some other characteristics shown in Table 1, as explanatory 
variables.  The functions do not include all the variables, however, in order to avoid the 
problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity.  Actually we exclude age from the 
regression. The dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur has work 
experience in the formal sector turned out to be positively and closely correlated with 
the years of schooling and the years of vocational training.  These variables are 
excluded from the regression.  The correlation coefficients among major dependent and 
independent variables are shown in Table 2. 
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 The function that explains enterprise growth includes the same set of 
explanatory variables representing the characteristics of the entrepreneur.  It also 
includes the logarithm of the number of workers in the initial year of the period.  This is 
a conventional specification of the growth regression used in the literature of enterprise 
growth as well as of cross-country growth comparison.  The OLS estimation of this 
regression equation, however, is subject to the endogeneity bias arising from the 
correlation between the initial size and the error term (e.g. Caselli et al. 1996).  A 
sophisticated approach to this problem may be to employ GMM estimators such as the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, which uses the lagged variables as instruments for 
the first difference equation.  Bigsten and Gebreeyesus (2007) apply this approach to the 
panel data on the manufacturing enterprises in Addis Ababa.  This approach, however, 
cannot be applied to our data because the data do not have enough length in the time-
series dimension. 
 Instead, we instrumented the initial enterprise size with some of the variables 
representing the characteristics of the entrepreneur.  In other words, we use the 
estimation of the function that explains the enterprise size as the first stage of the two-
stage least square (2SLS) regression.  According to Hypothesis 1, formal education has 
positive impacts on both the size and growth of an enterprise, and by contrast, 
vocational training, prior work experience, and management experience will have 
significant impacts only on enterprise size.  Thus, we attempt 2SLS regressions based 
on the assumption that the years of vocational training, the years of prior work 
experience, and the years of management of the current business serve as instruments.  
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The validity of this assumption is checked by conducting the first-stage F test and the 
over-identification test.10 
 To test Hypothesis 2, we regress the fraction of the sales revenues from quality-
conscious customers and the proportion of the direct procurement of materials on the 
same set of explanatory variables as the enterprise size and growth regressions, using 
the sample that excludes the leavers.  Since the fraction is censored from below at 0, we 
use the Tobit model specification.11 
4.2  Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the growth regressions.  Six dummy variables indicating 
activity types are also used to control for the effects common to the enterprises of the 
same activity type.  The default for these activity-type dummies is the metal product 
fabrication other than the production of scale balances, such as the fabrication of steel 
windows, steel furniture, and flour mills. The first two columns cover the two periods 
from 1998 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2002.  The data on the two periods are pooled, and 
the unobserved fixed effects, if any, are not treated as in the panel fixed-effect model.   
Column (1) shows the OLS estimates and column (2) shows the 2SLS estimates.  
Likewise, columns (3) and (4) show the OLS and 2SLS estimates, respectively, based 
on the pooled data of the two periods, 2002-2005 and 2005-2006.  The dependent 
variable is the annual growth rate of the number of workers during each period.  In the 
2SLS regressions, the initial employment size is instrumented with the years of 
                                                 
10 In order to save space, we do not report the results of the first-stage regression of the enterprise 
size.  See Sonobe et al. (2009b) for the estimation results. 
11 We also run panel fixed-effects regressions to examine the effect of the relocation from the cluster 
to a formal industrial area.  The dependent variable is the number of workers, and the main 
explanatory variable is the dummy variable that indicates whether the enterprise remains in the 
Kariobangi Light Industry or in a formal industrial area in the year.  The result shows that the 
relocation is significantly associated with an increase in the number of workers (Sonobe et al. 2009b). 
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vocational training, prior work experience, and management, as mentioned earlier.  
These variables have jointly significant effects in the first-stage regression in both the 
early two periods and the latter two periods, as shown toward the bottom of Table 3, 
even though only the years of management had a significant effect in 2002 and 2005.  
The results of the over-identification test a la Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) indicate 
that these instrumental variables do not have any direct effect on enterprise growth. 
 In the early two periods, the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the growth equation are 
similar, and both indicate that the years of schooling had no significant effect on 
enterprise growth.  In the later two periods, however, the 2SLS estimate of the effect of 
the initial employment size is much larger in absolute terms than the OLS estimate, and 
the effect of the years of schooling is positive and highly significant in both 
specifications.  The result that the effect of schooling was strengthened in the later 
periods supports Hypothesis 1.  To the extent that the initial employment size is 
endogenous, the OLS estimates are inconsistent.  That the consistent 2SLS estimate of 
the effect of the initial size became greater in absolute terms lends strong support to 
Hypothesis 3.   
Although not reported in the table, here too, the effects of the explanatory 
variables on growth remain qualitatively unchanged if the leavers are included in the 
sample.  The magnitudes of the effects are changed as follows.  Firstly, the inclusion of 
the leavers weakens the negative effect of the initial employment size compared with 
the result in column (4).  Put differently, the growth constraint is estimated to be less 
severe if the leavers are included in the sample, suggesting that the relocation from 
Kariobangi to the formal industrial area relaxes the growth constraint.  Secondly, the 
inclusion of the leavers strengthens the growth effect of schooling, especially in the later 
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periods.  This is probably because the leavers tend to have high education, and their 
growth rates were much higher than the average, especially after their relocation. 
Table 4 shows the estimates of the functions explaining marketing to quality-
conscious customers and the direct procurement of materials.  The first two columns 
indicate clearly that the positive effect of schooling became stronger and that of 
vocational training became weaker in 2005 than in 1998/2000.  Although not shown in 
the table, the estimates of these effects for 2002 are in-between those for 1998/2000 and 
2005.  These results support Hypothesis 2.  If the leavers are included in the sample, the 
effect of schooling becomes stronger in each year and even stronger in 2005.  It is 
difficult to explain why the effect of the years of management was negative and 
significant in 1998/2000 and insignificant in 2005 and why that of the years of prior 
experience was negative and significant in 2005 and insignificant in 1998/200.  
However, these results suggest that experience as a worker or an entrepreneur is not 
very helpful in increasing the sale to quality-conscious customers.  According to 
columns (3) and (4), formal schooling became more important in 2005 than in 
1998/2000 for entrepreneurs to increase the direct procurement of materials as well.  
Vocational training, prior experience, and management experience did not have any 
significant effects on direct procurement in either year.  
 
5  Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the changing determinants of the size and growth of 
informal enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa, taking a Jua Kali metalworking cluster in 
Nairobi as an example.  Based on the experience of East Asia described by Sonobe and 
Otsuka (2006), we hypothesized that entrepreneurs become increasingly motivated to 
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make the multifaceted innovations that increase profitability, and that the more highly 
educated entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in achieving such improvements.  We 
also hypothesized that the multifaceted innovations (and the resulting growth in 
enterprise size) are difficult to achieve as long as the enterprises remain in the informal 
cluster.  The testable implications derived from these basic hypotheses are strongly 
supported by the descriptive data. 
 The results of the regression analyses more clearly indicate that while the 
relative advantage of improving product quality is increasing in the Jua Kali cluster, it 
is difficult to find customers who appreciate the high quality of products and to find 
space to expand operations.  Such growth constraints faced by the enterprises remaining 
in the cluster are becoming more severe.  The question may arise as to why they hesitate 
to move to formal industrial areas, where they can further the multifaceted innovations 
and expand operations.  For them to become formal, they need to be able to generate 
high profits that exceed the moving cost and other fixed costs associated with the 
relocation and transformation from an informal to formal enterprise.  These costs 
include the cost of product certification by the Kenya Bureau of Standards, the cost of 
renting a large workshop, and the cost of meeting other statutory requirements.  In 
addition to such costs, uncertainty seems to make them hesitant.  To sum up, while the 
majority of enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa do not grow partly because of the growth 
constraints of congested clusters and partly because of the lack of entrepreneurial ability 
of managers, some enterprises managed by educated owners grow successfully by 
taking the risk of introducing new management strategies including relocation.      
Such ability and uncertainty are the functions of knowledge, however.  If the 
entrepreneur is more knowledgeable, he is more likely to generate high profits by 
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achieving the multifaceted innovations successfully, and his assessment of profitability 
will be more accurate.  According to our interviews with a large number of enterprise 
managers, formal education as well as work experience in the formal sector is the key to 
learning improved production methods and upgrading product quality, which, in turn, 
makes it possible to sell final products to higher-end users.  To be truly successful, an 
entrepreneur must convey quality information to users properly. Tacit, non-codifiable, 
and valuable know-how in metal work and specifically developed marketing channels 
based on trust with end-users are unlikely to be imitated easily by competing firms in 
the cluster.   
It is critically important for policymakers in Sub-Saharan Africa to recognize that 
informal clusters may be able to encourage and support firm growth and eventual 
formalization, even without the assistance from formal clusters and global value chains. 
Such development has widely occurred in East Asia (Sonobe and Otsuka 2006).  To 
support the growth of informal clusters further and their job creation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is highly desirable for the government, foreign aid agencies, and NGOs to 
assist the remaining entrepreneurs in following suit.  An effective strategy for this 
purpose is to provide entrepreneurs with training programs that teach them how to 
achieve the multifaceted innovations in products, marketing, and management 
simultaneously.12   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 In collaboration with the World Bank, such a training program was offered in Kariobangi in April 
2008.  It is too early to judge, however, how effective such a program will be. 
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Table 1 Average characteristics of managers of sample enterprises, and their size and  
marketing channels 
 Total Leavers Remaining group 
Sample size 127 7 120 
Experience in formal sector (%) 62 71 62 
Age in 2006 40.0 45.6 39.7 
Years of schooloing 11.0 13.0 10.9 
Years of vocational training 1.0 2.6 0.9 
Years of prior experience in 
          similar businesses 
4.2 
 
8.7 3.9 
 
Years of management experience 7.6 9.3 7.5 
Employment size in 2006 
                             in 1998/2000 
6.2 
4.5 
25.1 
17.0 
5.1 
4.0 
Marketing to quality-conscious 
          customers (% of revenue) 
                            in 2005 
                            in 1998/2000 
 
 
12.4 
9.6 
 
 
55.0 
51.0 
 
 
6.2 
9.2 
Direct procurement (% of 
material cost) 
                  in 2005 
                  in 1998/2000 
 
 
27.1 
28.9 
 
 
50.7 
31.0 
 
 
28.8 
25.4 
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Table 2 Correlation matrix among major dependent and independent variables 
 L GL Market-
ing 
School-
ing 
VOC EXP MGT-
EXP 
Employment size (L) 1.00       
Growth rate of L .22 1.00      
Marketing to quality-
conscious customers 
.34 .05 1.00     
Schooling years of 
managers  
.36 .07 .25 1.00    
Years of vocational 
training (VOC) 
.15 -.03 .19 .20 1.00   
Years of prior 
experience (EXP) 
.27 -.12 .07 .17 .11 1.00  
Years of management 
experience (MGT-EXP) 
.31 -.17 .02 -.00 .15 .08 1.00 
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Table 3  OLS and 2SLS regression estimates of the effect of entrepreneurs’ human 
capital on employment growth in the sample excluding the leavers a 
 1998-2000 and 2000-2002  2002-2005 and 2005-2006  
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged log of employment 
b -0.073*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.083** 
(-2.40) 
-0.064* 
(-1.66) 
-0.299** 
(-2.53) 
Years of schooling 0.008 
(1.20) 
0.008 
(1.19) 
0.030*** 
(2.64) 
0.050*** 
(3.30) 
Years of vocational training 0.004 
(0.40) 
 -0.001 
(-0.05) 
 
Years of prior experience -0.006 
(-1.02) 
 0.004 
(0.69) 
 
Years of management  0.001 
(0.35) 
 -0.014** 
(-2.51) 
 
Soap making dummy 0.264*** 
(2.66) 
0.272*** 
(4.21) 
-0.247 
(-1.64) 
-0.120 
(-0.50) 
Car repair dummy -0.023 
(-0.41) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.095 
(-1.04) 
-0.043 
(-0.44) 
Parts dummy -0.060 
(-1.29) 
-0.043 
(-0.89) 
-0.041 
(-0.62) 
-0.053 
(-0.67) 
Balance dummy -0.090 
(-1.36) 
-0.063 
(-1.12) 
-0.106 
(-1.00) 
-0.005 
(-0.57) 
Hardware dummy -0.127 
(-1.51) 
-0.116** 
(-2.59) 
-0.156 
(-1.41) 
-0.197** 
(-2.03) 
Misc. service dummy -0.016 
(-0.24) 
-0.0001 
(-0.00) 
0.007 
(0.07) 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
The first period dummy 0.032 
(0.96) 
0.028 
(0.85) 
0.104** 
(1.98) 
0.044 
(0.75) 
Intercept 0.071 
(0.82) 
0.068 
(0.88) 
-0.124 
(-0.93) 
-0.141 
(-1.14) 
Number of enterprises 128 128 207 207 
R-squared 0.21  0.15  
First-stage F  27.56***  12.95*** 
Over-identification test 2  1.59  0.92 
a. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate, approximated by the difference 
between the log of the number of employees and its lagged value, divided by the 
number of years between the two observations.  Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics based on the robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
b. The lagged employment variable is instrumented in 2SLS regressions in columns (2) 
and (4). 
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Table 4  Tobit regression estimates of the functions explaining marketing to quality-
conscious customers and direct procurement in the sample excluding the leavers, 
hardware shops, and miscellaneous service providers a 
 Marketing Procurement 
 1998/2000  2005 1998/2000 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years of schooling 0.041* 
(1.81) 
0.049** 
(2.11) 
0.050 
(1.57) 
0.101** 
(2.24) 
Years of vocational training 0.081** 
(2.33) 
0.038 
(0.91) 
0.058 
(1.31) 
0.107 
(1.60) 
Years of prior experience 0.002 
(0.10) 
-0.025* 
(-1.78) 
-0.035 
(-1.24) 
-0.040 
(-1.19) 
Years of management  -0.029*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.004 
(-0.36) 
0.038 
(0.26) 
-0.010 
(-0.52) 
Soap dummy 0.721*** 
(2.79) 
0.911*** 
(3.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.00) 
-0.008 
(-0.02) 
Car repair dummy 0.517*** 
(3.39) 
0.462*** 
(2.78) 
0.193 
(0.85) 
-0.360 
(-0.92) 
Parts dummy -0.060 
(-0.47) 
-0.091 
(-0.71) 
-0.067 
(-0.34) 
-0.297 
(-1.23) 
Balance dummy -0.229 
(-1.16) 
-0.386* 
(-1.68) 
0.515** 
(2.24) 
0.205 
(0.70) 
Year 2000 dummy 0.116 
(1.12) 
 -0.122 
(-0.85) 
 
Intercept -0.442 
(-1.65) 
-0.406 
(-1.49) 
-0.962** 
(-2.31) 
-1.639** 
(-2.59) 
Number of enterprises 120 96 121 93 
Number of left-censored 
obs. 
54 45 94 78 
 
a. The dependent variable is the fraction of sales revenue from special orders and 
exports in columns (1) and (2) and the fraction of material cost for procurement 
from special sources in columns (3) and (4).  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
based on the robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate the statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
